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Abstract
The harshness of punishment society chooses to impose on crime o¤enders
is mandated by law. However, the quality of life in prison can make this pun-
ishment harsher. This creates a variation in the severity of punishment which
is not legislated and may di¤er from societys taste for penalties. Indicators
of in prison violence and conicts seem to be appropriate proxy variables for
prison conditions. Using indicators of in prison violent behavior, we use an
exogenous source in education participation in educational programs in order
to asses the e¤ect of education on such measures of conict. Applying instru-
mental variables techniques to census data for Argentine prisons, we nd that
educational programs signicantly reduce indicators of property damages in
prison. Such reductions amounts to a 60 percent decrease relative to the mean
level of property damages.
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1 Introduction
The quality of life in prisons is a relevant component of the e¤ectivepunishment
prisoners face while doing time. For a given sentence, a more violent and conictive
facility makes punishment harsher. Katz et al. (2003) nd evidence that quality of
life in prisons, proxied by the number of deaths within a facility, has a deterrent e¤ect
on crime and that such e¤ect is higher than the controversial deterrent e¤ect of death
penalty. Di Tella and Dubra (2006) build a model where societys beliefs, the level
of punishment and the economic system are jointly determined, giving rise to two
di¤erent equilibria: one with harsher punishment than the other. The authors show
that the severity of punishment is jointly determined with the economic system.1
From the point of view of a system based on retribution, varying prison conditions
corresponds to a change in retribution which is not legislated. In this sense, worse
prison conditions could be seen as one societys taste for more severe punishment and
a legal system which does not encompass such taste. Also, for adherents to the idea of
deterrence, the quality of prison life is also relevant, since it may also represent varying
degrees of deterrence which are not directly related to the intended punishment.
In Argentina, which is just one example but that may be generalized to other
western democracies, the idea of imprisonment is to restrain an individual from am-
bulatory freedom. This means that in principle, individuals should face the same
rights in prisons (i.e. health, education, human and civil rights) than individuals out-
side them, with the exception of free circulation. For example, if an inmate does not
meet the years of education mandated by law, she should be able to get her education
while in prison. The same applies to health and the minimum requirements covered
by law. In this context, degraded living conditions inside prisons impose a higher
punishment that the one mandated by law. While the quality of life inside prison
is not completely independent from average prisonerscharacteristics2, it should be
1They develop a model to explain the empirical fact that countries that believe in the so called
American dream, where e¤ort pays have also harsher punishment. They show beliefs are correlated
with the economic system and, too, with the system of punishment. In their model, two equilibria
(harsh and soft punishment) arise. Both equilibria have identical fundamentas but di¤erent beliefs
about the luck relative to e¤ort in the realization of income.
2Dangerous prisoners may often cause harm to their peers, lowering the quality of life in prisons.
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the prison authoritiesduty to ensure inmates are fullling their sentence properly,
according to the punishment mandated by law.
The quality of life in prison has many dimensions, ranging from providing prison
amenities such as athletic facilities and cable TV in the United States to very basic
health and educational services in Latin America. However, the level of conict within
a prison can be considered as a proxy variable for such quality of life. High conictive
jails can be regarded as having a low quality of life and vice-versa. It is true that the
level of conict for a given prison is not independent from the prisoners inside, which
varies a lot among facilities. However, at least for the case of Latin American prisons,
there are also many circumstances a¤ecting the level of conict within a prison that
are related to their management and administration. For the specic case of Argentina
Isla and Miguez (2003) document the very poor quality in the prison administration
system mentioning several factors. Among them, personnel absenteeism is very high,
human capital of prison managers and guards is very low. Moreover, prison guards
hardly have any skill in conict resolution techniques and some times they are the
ones initiating a conict and/or perpetuating bitterness among prisoners.
If we believe that sentences mandated by law, either adhering at the idea of retri-
bution or to the deterrence one, reect societys taste for punishment then, the quality
of life in prisons should be guaranteed to surpass some set of minimal standards. We
argue that quality of life within prisons can be proxied by in prison conict and vio-
lent behavior. Therefore to lower in prison conicts is one way of enhancing the living
standards of prisoners. However, lowering prison conicts puts some pressure on pub-
lic expenditure from local and federal governments, which often lack human resources
to perform such activities. Moreover, there is an old criminological nding (Schnur,
1949) showing a positive relationship between prison conicts and recidivism, but in
the opposite direction of the argument held by Katz et al. (2003).
Given the motives described above, it seems relevant to study which policies that
are already in place can decrease in prison conict. Among the activities that are
present in most prisons, educational programs are often available to prisoners for
several reasons. The main argument to have prison based educational and training
programs is that given the high incarceration rate of individuals, from minorities
or vulnerable groups, such programs are often justied to facilitate o¤enders to re-
integrate into society successfully. Wilson et al. (1999) surveys the literature looking
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at the relationship between educational programs and recidivism. Unfortunately,
most of the evidence cannot overcome the selection problem, i.e. less conictive
prisoners are more likely to participate and less likely to relapse in the rst place.
Steurer, Smith and Tracy (2001) show that participants in prison based educational
programs in three states of the American Union enjoy higher subsequent earnings
once they are released from prison. Unfortunately, the study does not address the
bias caused from self-selection into educational programs. Tyler and Kling (2006)
use panel data in order to control for time invariant unobserved heterogeneity among
inmates in the state of Florida and nd that General Educational Development (GED)
programs o¤ered in prison increase post release earnings 15% for minorities with
respect to non participants, even though these e¤ects fade after three years. They
nd no signicant e¤ect of participating in GED programs.
In terms of experiences in developing countries, Argentina boasts a long tradition
in prison based educational programs, starting in the early 1950s. However, evidence
on the e¤ects of such programs is scarce and neither literature concerning prison con-
ditions in Argentina is abundant. Isla and Miguez (2003) provide anecdotal evidence
of life inside prisons for convicted thieves. They state that in Argentine prisons they
are often neglected and that there are violent spaces where the quality of life is quite
poor. According to the authors, by no means prisons have any "reforming e¤ect" on
inmates. Prisons are portrayed as highly corrupted places, where prison authorities
are often the ones inciting violent behavior. Furthermore, given the current state
of the prison system, a prison is regarded as a "school of criminals" perpetuating
exclusion and marginality.3 In contrast with this view, Scarfo (2008) provides also
anecdotal evidence of schools functioning in prisons in the province of Buenos, Aires,
where half of the countrys prison population is concentrated. According to the au-
thor, schools provide a safe environment within the prison and class rooms are spaces
where penitentiary o¢ cers are not allowed while lectures are taking place. Scarfo
argues that educational programs within prisons are important as a way to help in-
dividuals to re-enter society. In a survey of about 200 individual cases of prisoners
it can be observed the very low educational attainment of inmates.4 Moreover, tests
administered prior to this survey show that while more than 92% of surveyed indi-
3Evidence of this is found by Bayer et al. (2009) for juvenile correctionals in the USA.
4This nding is consistent with the survey data we later use in the paper.
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viduals state they can read and write, they fail basic reading/writing requirements.
Also, 50% of respondents stated that they believe they will learn useful things by
participating in in-prison educational programs and 32% think they will have a bet-
ter chance of improving their "conduct". Focus groups among prison students in the
province of Buenos Aires reveal a perception that education is regarded as benecial
inside and eventually outside prison since it can improve prisoners skills.
It is entirely possible that both views can come to be true for di¤erent individuals:
some could be truly reformed while others can become better criminals. Given these
opposite views of in prison education programs it is quite interesting to evaluate
them using an impact evaluation program methodology. For policy considerations
one would be interested in nding out if on average individuals that participate in
education programs tend to engage in less conicts/violent behavior.
Using census data for sentenced male Argentinean prisoners during 2002-2005,
this paper studies the importance of improving the quality of life in prisons for those
that participate in educational programs relative to those that do not by observing
if there is a reduction in di¤erent indicators of conict/violent behavior. Law 24.660
from 1996 mandates that all prisoners with less than the minimum required education
level should participate in education programs. Because of administrative limitations
at the province level this mandate is not completely fullled for all eligible prisoners.
Specically, on average only 25% of eligible prisoners under the mandate of the law
actually end up participating. Moreover, this percentage varies widely within and
across provinces which gives us a seemingly source of exogenous variation that creates
two groups of individuals: those that by law should receive the minimum required
education and do so and those that should but do not. Under a probit estimation
procedure we nd that participation in education programs for this population reduces
signicantly conicts measured by injuries, property damages, sanctions and severe
sanctions within prisons. Specically, the estimated magnitudes of the e¤ects on
injuries lie between 0.1 and 0.3 percentage points; on property damages between 0.1
and 0.8 percentage points; on sanctions between 1.3 and 1.8 percentage points and
nally for severe sanctions lie between 0.9 and 1.5 percentage points. Acknowledging
the possible existence of an omitted self selection term we use per capita expenditure
in education at the province level as an instrument for education participation. We
nd that participation in education programs reduces on average property damages
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in a percentage point in a statistically signicant way which interpreted relative to
the mean percentage of property damages in the sample yields a reduction of 50% in
these type of conicts.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section two presents the
conceptual framework, section three briey describes the Argentinean Penal and Ed-
ucational System for inmates, section four describes the data used in the paper while
section ve presents the main results. Finally, section six concludes.
2 Conceptual Framework
To estimate the impact of prison education participation on conictive behavior one
needs an exogenous variation in participation at the individual level since it could be
the case that there is self-selection from prisoners to participate in these programs.
In this paper, we exploit a mandatory law of prisonerseducation rights in Argentina.
Law 24.195 of 1996 states that prisons must guarantee schooling for inmates whose
educational attainment is below the compulsory nine years of basic education (com-
plete Educación General Básica EGB).5 The law mandates that any inmate failing
to provide the necessary documentation that proves that he has not completed EGB
must attend school while in prison. For higher educational levels, prisons may or may
not o¤er such education. However, there are administrative and nancial limitations
at the provincial level to fulll the mandate of this law. This gives us an exogenous
variation which creates two groups of individuals: those that by law should receive
education EGB and do and those that should and do not.
In this paper we rst study the relation between education participation for these
two groups on several conict behavior measures at the individual level through a
simple di¤erence estimator of the form
conf = + edpart+X + Z + error (1)
where conf denotes a binary measure of conict/violence at the individual level.
Edpart is a binary variable for eligible individuals under the law that takes the value
5It is worth mentioning that this law has been modied by Law 26.206 of December 2006. How-
ever, the period analyzed in this paper is 2002-2005 and therefore Law 24.195 is the relevant one for
us.
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one if the individual participates in EGB program and zero otherwise. Finally, the
terms X and Z represent individual and prison/province characteristics. If, due
to administrative and nancial limitations, participation of prisoners in educational
programs at the province level is randomly assigned (or only depends on controls X
and/or Z); a probit estimator gives an unbiased and consistent estimate of .
If we are willing to assume selection into educational programs takes place based
on observable characteristics, we can apply propensity score matching. We obtain
local linear propensity score estimates of the average treatment e¤ect that educa-
tion participation has on conicts inside prisons where participation is based on all
variables included in X and Z.
However, it could be the case that some type of self selection among prisoners
is present in this process. If such e¤ect is not fully captured by X or Z, both the
probit and the matching estimator are biased and inconsistent. If in the error term
si correlated with the education decision, both estimators will be biased. A priori
it is di¢ cult to know whether positive or negative selection may emerge. One view
is that prisoners truly interested in being reformed might self-select positively into
these programs if participation is granted on request. On the other hand, it could
be the case that participation in these programs depends on the inuence a prisoner
has inside the prison. If so, these could actually be the most violent individuals that
probably do not view education as a way to reform themselves. Finally, it could
also be possible that prison authorities select which prisoners participate either as a
reward for good behavior or a precautionary measure by sending the most conictive
prisoners.
Under this scenario the law mandate should be seen as generating only a partial
exogenous variation of participation in prison education programs. Therefore, to esti-
mate the e¤ect of participation on conictive behavior one requires a second source of
exogenous variation that determines individual participation within the two groups
but should not a¤ect directly conictive behavior. We argue that in Argentina a
source of exogenous variation that determines participation in prison education pro-
grams is total per capita spending in education at the province level. Even under a
self selection story the nal number of prisoners that end up participating will depend
on the supply of education inputs e.g. number of available seats in the classroom or
availability of teachers for adult education, among others. While prison education
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is mandated at the national level, it is actually supplied by provincial authorities.
Hence, the nal supply of in prison education depends on schooling public budgets
at the provincial level.
Figures 1 to 4 provide evidence compatible with our assumption. They show a re-
duced form relation between mean per capita education expenditure at the provincial
level and the corresponding percentage of conictive interactions within prisons used
in this paper. Conict or violence at the province level is an average across prison
facilities of four in prison measures: i) property damages, ii) personal injuries, iii)
sanctions to prisoners due to inappropriate behavior and iv) severe sanctions.6 These
gures reveal a negative relation between mean per capita expenditure in education
and measures of conict in prisons across provinces. Provinces that have a higher
per capita expenditure in education have on average lower in prison conicts. Our
theory is that per capita expenditure in education inuence the supply of education
for prisoners. To substantiate this we regress conictive behavior of an individual
on his education participation in prison programs and instrument the latter by per
capita expenditure in education at the province level.
The exclusion restriction of this two stage instrumental variable procedure is that,
conditional on the controls included in the regression, per capita expenditure in edu-
cation at the province level is only related with in prison conict through education
participation in prison education programs. Particularly, this restriction will not
hold if per capita expenditure in education at the province level is correlated with the
attitudes of provincial authorities or civil population towards prisonerswell-being.
For instance, provinces that care about in prison conicts could allocate a higher
amount of resources to the education sector. We believe this is not the case for sev-
eral reasons. First, while expenditure on education is decentralized, given the way the
central government redistributes taxes at the province level, there is very little scope
for provincial governments to increase/decrease educational expenditure.7 Second,
the total expenditure in education at the province level should not be inuenced by
the small or even negligible number of prisoners relative to the aggregate population.
6All these measures are described in detail in the data section.
7Law 24.195 sets the amount that should be spent on education at the national level. More-
over, most of provincial income is not generated by provincial revenues but by national government
transfers, circa 80%, according to Rivas and Mezzadra (2005). The authors show that there is little
correlation between provincial educational needs and transfers and that such transfers are the result
of complicated political aggreements instead of a set of rules.
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Specically, on average prison population represents only 0.001% of total population
in the province. Last but not least, if there is indeed a correlation between total
expenditure in education and preferences of prisoner well-being at the province level
it is reasonable to believe that it would be constant through time. All specications
include province xed e¤ects and dummies indicating changes of government at the
province level in order to account for this possibility.
3 Prisons and Education in Argentina
3.1 The Argentine Penal Legislation
In 1996 the Argentine Congress approved Law 24.660. This law regulates punishment
depriving personal freedom for convicted individuals and replaced the previous which
dated back to 1958. The goal of this new law is to make inmates acquire the capacity
to understand and respect the law, endeavoring their proper reintegration to society.
Law 24.660 states that the mandatory treatment of the inmates must be programmed
and individually monitored with respect to the norms that regulate life, discipline and
work. Moreover, the penitentiary regime is based on the notion of progressiveness.
This notion limits the time that inmates stay in closed prisons as well as the time
for promotion to the following stage, conditioned on a positive evaluation of the
inmates conduct.8 The progressiveness of the penitentiary regime applied to convicts
is characterized by four periods:
1. Observational period: during this period, the inmate is evaluated in several
dimensions. She has medical, psychological and social evaluations, together
with a criminological prole. All this information must be properly led and
updated.
2. Treatment period: during this period and according to prison facilities, the in-
mate goes through di¤erent phases in order to gradually attenuate the restric-
tions imposed by the sentence. This may include changes within each prison
department or even prison transfers.
8Cfr. Argetine Law 24.660, articles 1-6
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3. Test period: this period comprises the gradual incorporation of the inmate to less
restrictive activities, including the incorporation to the regime of semi-liberty.
4. Parole period: the inmate leaves the prison for periods up to seventy two hours
in order to carry out di¤erent activities: studying, participation in training
programs, family visits, work, etc.
Each time an inmate enters a prison, he must be examined by a doctor, who
certicates the inmatesphysical and mental health. Also, some basic information
about the inmate is gathered on his personal le.9 Once the entry proceedings are
nished, and in order to avoid possible conicts among prisoners, inmates are gathered
into homogeneous groups taking into account the o¤enders sex, age, physical and
mental health, schooling attainment, criminal record and the nature of the o¤ence
committed.
The Federal Penitentiary Service (SPF, for its Spanish abbreviation) is in charge
of all federal prisons in Argentina while each Provincial Penitentiary Service is in
charge of the remaining prisons within each province. All o¤enders to the federal
system are put away in federal prisons, i.e. tax evasion, drug tra¢ cking, smuggling,
counterfeiting, money laundering, among other felonies, as well as all o¤ences com-
mitted in the National Capital City (CABA10). All other prisoners must serve time in
the provincial penitentiaries. When a sentenced prisoner is sent to prison, the criteria
to choose which prison should she be sent to is based on the type of crime committed
and distance to her relatives.
3.2 Educational Requirements for Inmates
The educational system in Argentina is divided in 5 periods: 1) Initial education
(kindergarten) for children between three and ve years of age; 2) General education
(EGB or Educación General Básica) which is mandatory, lasts for nine years and
starts at the age of six; 3) "Polimodal" education (high school) which lasts for 3
years and where students can opt for di¤erent specializations (humanities, sciences,
9Marital and legal status, educational level, etc.
10Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires
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etc) during this cycle;11 4) Superior education which includes tertiary and university
studies; and nally 5) Graduate education.
The penal system is designed to encourage prisoners good behavior by means
of rewarding positive actions and punishing negative ones. The education acquired
is oriented so as to make inmates acknowledge her obligations and the norms that
govern life in society. In particular, the inmates right to acquire education must be
guaranteed from the moment they enter the prison. Specically, Law 24.660 states
that every prisoner whose educational attainment is below the compulsory nine years
(EGB) must receive education while in prison. For other educational levels (polimodal
and superior education), prisoners may or may not receive such education.12
The system regulating education in Argentina was decentralized in the early nine-
teen nineties, where the Argentine Congress transferred most primary and secondary
schools to provincial governments. Even though in prison education is supervised by
the Ministry of Justice (a national authority) as a result of school decentralization
this federal entity has to make individual agreements with each Ministry of Educa-
tion at the province level. Hence, while all the in-prison education is coordinated at
the national level, it has to be supplied by provincial authorities. In this vein, each
provincial government must guarantee a functioning school in each prison.
However, there are severe limitations to fulll the mandate of Law 24.660. The
rst problem is a chronic shortage of supply of prison educational programs. One
important input of such programs is adult education teachers who are scarce across
the country. This scarceness is more evident for prisons given that there are no
extra incentives for teachers to work in those institutions.13 Second, even though the
facilities that have both remanded and sentenced prisoners should guarantee in prison
education to all of them, the Ministry of Justice does not enforce this requirement
for the remanded prisoners. So, in practice, education is not really available for all
the inmates that should be attending school. Finally, even though there is a protocol
for allocating inmates to classes in the case of excess demand, favoring rst those
who are either illiterate or are about to nish compulsory education, such protocol is
11In order to compare it with the United States system, EGB is the sum of elementary education
plus two years of high school. On the other hand Polimodal level is equivalent to the last three years
of high school in the United States.
12For example in Buenos Aires, some university degrees can be obtained. The Centro Universitario
de Devoto has over 200 university students who are inmmates.
13There is no wage di¤erential for teaching in prisons.
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generally altered by prison authorities.
4 Data
The data used in this paper comes from The National Statistical System about the
Observance of Punishment (SNEEP for its Spanish abbreviation).14 The system has
the objective of periodically gathering statistical information about all sentenced and
remanded prisoners in the whole country. Annually, the system collects the data
from both federal and provincial prisons. The information is gathered through a
specic questionnaire which includes census data of prison population and species
important events that happened to the prisoner during that year. In the rst part of
the questionnaire there is information about the inmates age, sex, nationality, marital
status, educational level, working status and training level, place of residence before
incarceration, judicial jurisdiction, legal status, where the inmate comes from (direct
entry or transferred from another prison) and type of the o¤ence committed. In the
second part of the questionnaire there is information about what the inmate did over
the past year. There are also questions about the prisoners activities (work in prison,
training attainment, participation in educational programs, sports and recreational
activities) and if they received medical attention and visits. Finally, there is also a
record about the inmate conduct, disciplinary sanctions, attempts to escape, security
measures15 and their status on the progressive system.
Information from the SNEEP is available through out the period 2002 to 2005.
Each year, data on all remanded and sentenced prisoners in the country is collected,
which implies information on approximately 45,000 individuals per year. Unfortu-
nately, the system is not designed to allow the merging of observations in a panel of
prisons nor prisoners throughout the period, forcing us to use the data as a pooled
cross-section data set. Based on this restriction, the pooled years give us information
on 184,374 inmates. However, in this paper information of only a selected group of
prisoners will be used. Specically, we restrict our information to only prisoners that
have received a sentence (43.1% of all prisoners) and that are in the observational or
treatment period of progressiveness to ensure ourselves that they spend all of their
14Sistema Nacional de Estadísticas sobre Ejecución de la Pena (SNEEP)
15Cfr. Penal Code, art 52
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time inside the correctional (72.39% of all sentenced prisoners). This selection was
done due to several motives. First, the sample is restricted to sentenced prisoners
because education is not available for remanded prisoner, in spite of being required
by law.16 Secondly, we only consider sentenced inmates who are not able to leave the
prisons because inmates in test or parole treatment may leave the prison for some
period of time, and some of them may participate in educational activities outside
the prisons, but this information is not available in SNEEP.
Moreover, we further restrict this sample to use only male Argentinean prisoners
excluding the relatively few foreigners that are located in provincial prisons since the
mandate of the law states that prisons must guarantee schooling for argentine inmates
whose educational attainment is below the compulsory nine years of basic education
(complete EGB). We also decided to drop all prisoners that report zero as their age
(29 prisoners) and if their reported date of sentence was before 1993 (396 prisoners),
after 2005 (1,010 prisoners) or missing (2,734).17 Hence, our treatment and control
groups are those that by law should receive education EGB and do and those that
should and do not. Of our restricted sample 81% of them report a level of education
lower than EGB leaving us with a nal restricted sample of 26,531 prisoners. We
nd that only 30% of the prisoners who should receive mandatory education indeed
are participating in an educational program. These 7,829 prisoners will therefore
comprise our treatment group while the remaining 18,702 conform our control group.
The main characteristics of the sample can be observed in tables 1 and 2. The
rst table presents the number of prisoners in each province that have not completed
EGB and hence, according to Law 24.660, should be receiving education while in
prison. As it can be appraised, e¤ective participation rates of inmates in formal
education programs is relatively low even though the law states it should be 100%.
While the average participation rate is 25%, it actually varies widely across provinces
suggesting di¤erent administrative state units have di¤erent supply of educational
16The latter do not participate from formal educational programs because they are often trans-
ferred among di¤erent prisons/regions while waiting for trial -educational curricula is not homoge-
neous across states- and due to the lack of adult teachers, who are always assigned rst to sentenced
prisoners.
17This last restriction was done because law 24.660 was passed in 1993 and hence only prisoners
sentenced after this date should be covered by it. Similarly, if the date of reported sentence was
after 2005 or missing it would mean that the prisoners are really still under process or we are not
able to determine for certain if he is condemned or his case is still under process.
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facilities available to inmates. For example, participation is above 50% in only three
provinces and is below 10% in ve others. Moreover, as can be observed the standard
deviation across years in each province also varies widely. Table 2 shows summary
statistics of the individual characteristics of the inmates in the selected sample and
of the prisons they belong to.
In terms of the information used to measure conicts (conf) four di¤erent speci-
cations are used. Two are related to the punishment individuals receive as a result
of inappropriate conduct and the other two comprise information of actual violent
activities. A rst measure of inappropriate behavior is sanctions (Sancs) which takes
the value one if the inmate received any type of sanction during the period observed.
A second measure is severe sanctions (Sevsancs) which takes the value one if the
inmate received a severe sanction during the period, where severe sanction means
that the inmate was isolated in his chamber for fteen consecutive days or seven
weekends as well if the inmate was taken to a higher security facility. It should be
noticed that Sancs includes Sevsancs in the sense that all severe sanctions are sanc-
tions. Our rst measure of violent activities is involvement in damaged property (Pd)
which takes the value one if the inmate participated in any violent behavior where
property damages occurred during the corresponding period. A second measure of
violent activity is dened as injuries (Inj) which takes the value one if the inmate
participated in any violent behavior that involved injuries or mortal wounds to others
during the observed period. The two measures Pd and Inj are disjoint in the sense
that property damages does not include acts of violence that ended up in injuries.
Furthermore, the survey includes a question which serves to determine if the prisoner
had an inappropriate conduct during the observed period. To reduce measurement
error on our dependent variables we interact this information with the four measures
of conict giving us measures of conict for individuals that were actually reported
to have an inappropriate conduct.
Descriptive statistics of these conict measures are shown in table 3. While 9% of
the sample faced some sort of sanctions as punishment for inappropriate behavior, 8%
faced some type of severe sanction. In contrast, only 2% of the inmates have partici-
pated in violent activities causing property damages and only 1% are reported to be
involved in extremely violent episodes causing injuries. Violent indicators somehow
misrepresent conict in prisons, as it can be observed between the di¤erences in the
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percentage of inmates participating in violent activities vis à vis the ones receiving
sanctions. This divergence is caused by the fact that the inmate can appeal to the
courts when faced with in-prison violent charges. If he is found not guilty, this infor-
mation is removed from the inmates le, whereas prisoners punishment via sanctions
cannot be undone. Hence in the remaining of the paper we use both type of measures.
5 Results
5.1 Probit Estimates
Recall that we have a pooled cross section data set at the individual level. We use a
maximum likelihood approach to estimate  which yields a probit di¤erence estimator
under normality of the error term. The corresponding empirical specication of (1)
is the following
confips = + edpartips +Xips + Zps + t + as + uips (2)
where confips is the binary measure of conict of individual i in prison p and province
s ; edpartips takes the value one if individual i in prison p and province s participates
in an education program under the mandate of Law 24.660 and zero otherwise; X and
Z are vectors of individual and prison/province characteristics respectively described
in Table 2; t and as are time and province xed e¤ects while uips represents the
idiosyncratic error.
Table 4 reports four di¤erent specications of (2) for each of our conict mea-
sures where all of them include province and time xed e¤ects. Moreover, in all
specications we present both Huber-White robust standard errors allowing arbi-
trary patterns of within-province serial correlation and clustered standard errors at
the province level.18 The rst specication for each measure presents the estimate
of  controlling only for province and time xed e¤ects. For most of the conict
measures the estimate is negative and statistically signicant under robust standard
errors, suggesting that participation in education programs is related with lower in
18Bertrand et al. (2004) report that robust standard errors provide good performance in panels
where the number of time periods is small such as the one we have. However, cluster standard errors
are also reported to allow possible correlation among prisoners within the same province.
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prison conict. Nonetheless, all measures are statistically insignicant under clustered
standard errors.
These estimates would provide an unbiased and consistent e¤ect of prison educa-
tion programs if participation was independent of any individual, prison and province
characteristic. This assumption is probably too strong and hence the remaining spec-
ications reported in Table 4 include in a step wise fashion additional controls from
the X and Z vectors. The second specication includes only prisoners individual
characteristics. As can be observed, the sign, magnitude and statistical signicance
of education participation is maintained for all conict measures. The only exception
is Injuries which is now negative and statistically signicant suggesting that partici-
pation is correlated with some prisoner characteristics. It is interesting to note that
there are some consistent characteristics that are related with conictive/violent be-
havior inside prisons. For example, individuals that have been more time in jail, that
are sentenced for a greater number of committed felonies and that are recidivist are
more likely to engage in inappropriate behavior. On the contrary, individuals that
are older, married and practice some sport within the prison are less likely to engage
in this type of behavior. Although not reported, the third specication include prison
and province characteristics. Among them we nd that prisons with a higher number
of prisoners, percentage of thieves and rapists are more likely to have more violent
interactions. We also nd that prisons with a higher percentage of murderers are less
likely to have violent interactions between prisoners. This result may be driven by the
fact that these are probably high security prisons where prisoners have less freedom
and are more monitored. Not surprisingly, after controlling for province xed e¤ects,
poverty and unemployment at the province level do not signicantly explain conict
inside prisons.
Even after controlling for all these individual, prison and province characteristics
it might still be the case that there is an unobservable characteristic of the individual
or the prison that determines both participation and inappropriate behavior. The
survey also provides information of whether the prisoner participates in any type of
labor activity inside the prison. It is reasonable to believe that participation in these
activities could proxy for the unobservables that determine participation in education
programs. Hence, the last specications of Table 4 include a dummy variable that
gives information if the prisoner participates or not in labor activities. As can be
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observed, prisoners that participate in labor activities are less likely to engage in
conictive behavior. More importantly, the estimate of education participation does
not change signicantly which reassures our previous ndings. These results are
statistically signicant under both cluster and robust standard errors, except for
property damages which is never signicant under the former.
Based on these last specications we nd that participation in education programs
reduce on average conictive/violent behavior. The practical signicance of such
programs are not negligible. Specically, participation in education programs reduces
Injuries and Property damages in 0.1 percentage points evaluated at the mean of all
control variables. Relative to the mean percentage of these violent behaviors reported
in table 3 we nd that education programs reduce them in 17% and 6% respectively.
Furthermore, participation in education programs reduce on average sanctions and
severe sanctions in 1.3 and 0.9 percentage points (or 15% and 11% relative to the
corresponding sample mean) respectively.
It is important to note that we cannot di¤erentiate the transmission mechanisms
through which this e¤ect of education programs takes place. It is perfectly consistent
with our results that two di¤erent mechanisms are at work. On the one side, edu-
cation programs could inuence the behavior of prisoners through changes in their
moral values and psychological attitudes towards violent behavior. On the other side,
it could be that the e¤ect found is capturing a reduction in idle time of prisoners.
On average, participation in education programs requires three hours per week day
(excluding Saturday and Sundays) amounting to 15 hours per week. Assuming that a
prisoner has 14 hours per day in idle time participation in education programs repre-
sents 15% of total time endowment. Given that we nd that on average inappropriate
behavior is reduced in 15% the second story is quite plausible. However, if the e¤ect
was entirely driven through this second channel we would expect to observe that after
controlling for labor activities (which also demands time) the estimate would have
reduced signicantly pointwise. We do not observe this which also gives evidence in
favor of the rst channel.
For policy purposes it might not be so important to distinguish which channel is
at work. For behavior within prisons the relevant aspect is that education programs
can reduce conictive and violent behavior which is important per se. For behavior
outside the prison, once the sentence term is completed, the evidence in favor of
17
the positive e¤ects of education programs on violent behavior has been established.
Schnur (1949) nds that recidivism rates decrease for prisoners with lower measures
of misconduct inside prisons. Furthermore, Phipps et al. (1999), Wilson et al. (2000);
Steuer and Smith (2003) and Tyler and Kling (2006) have obtained evidence in favor
of positive e¤ects that prison based education may have on recidivism rates and post
release income.
5.2 Propensity Score Matching Estimates
We also estimate the average treatment e¤ect of participating in education programs
for the eligible population using a local linear propensity score matching methodology.
To estimate the propensity to participate in these prison based education programs
we use all the variables in vectors X and Z. The results reported in Table 5 show
that the average treatment e¤ect for all conict measures is negative and statistically
signicant at the 1% level except for injuries. Compared to the probit estimates we
nd that the average treatment e¤ects under this estimation procedure are greater
in absolute terms. For the ones that are statistically signicant the magnitude of the
e¤ect under this estimation procedure is 0.8 percentage points for property damages,
1.8 pp for sanctions and 1.5 pp for severe sanctions. Relative to the mean percentage
of each conict measure in the sample these amount to a reduction of 51%, 20% and
19% respectively.
5.3 IV Estimates
As mentioned in the conceptual framework, the estimates presented above could be
biased and inconsistent if some type of self-selection among prisoners is present. If
in the error term there is a self-selection term that represents tendency to conictive
behavior, which is not captured by any variable included in X or Z, a positive or a
negative selection bias may arise. If prisoners that are less (respectively more) prone
to violent behavior are self-selecting themselves into the program a negative (positive)
bias arises in the di¤erence estimator. That is the e¤ect previously found would be
on average over (under) estimated.
To account for this possibility we instrument education participation with per
capita expenditure in education at the province level. As shown in Figures 1 to 4
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there is a negative reduced form relationship between mean per capita education
expenditure at the province level and our four conict measures. Our exclusion re-
striction is that mean per capita education expenditure at the province level directly
determines individual participation in prison based education programs but is not
correlated with the supposedly omitted self selection term. Evidence that our instru-
ment is relevant for individual participation is provided in the lower panel of Table
6. For all specications, the coe¢ cient of mean per capita education expenditure
at the province level is positive and statistically signicant at the 1 and 10% level
depending on the standard errors used. Even though not reported, all specications
include controls X and Z as well as time and province xed e¤ects.
A possible critique to the use of this instrument may be that expenditure in
education of a given province is correlated with the provinces preferences for the
well-being of prisoners and hence directly related with conict behavior inside prisons.
We argue that this is not the case for several reasons. As previously mentioned
there is very little scope for state governments to modify educational expenditures.
Furthermore, the number of prisoners relative to the aggregate provincial population
is insignicant making it di¢ cult to imagine that expenditure in education decisions
could be signicantly inuenced by the well being of prison population. Evidence
compatible with this view is shown in Figure 5. It presents the trend of mean per
capita expenditure in education across provinces which clearly has increased over the
period of analysis in all of them. These trends suggest that expenditure decisions
could be regarded as exogenous relative to in prison conict measures. Finally, all
regressions include province xed e¤ects and control for changes of state governors
during 2002 to 2005. These variables allow us to control for constant preferences
regarding the well being of prisoners as well as any changes that might occur due
to changes in Governors. Ultimatley we argue that our instrument is capturing how
changes in expenditure within provinces inuence individual participation in prison
education programs.
Table 6 presents the di¤erence estimates using our instrumental variable.19 Rel-
ative to our previous nding we observe that the e¤ect of participation in prison
education programs has a higher absolute coe¢ cient for all conict measures. Un-
der our exclusion restriction this implies that the di¤erence estimator presented a
19All specications present bootstrap standard errors to account for the rst stage estimation.
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positive bias and that prisoners with a higher unobservable violence propensity were
self selecting themselves. Alternatively, this is also compatible with the idea that
prisonsauthorities are selecting their most conictive prisoners into these programs.
Nonetheless, the standard errors also increase and hence only for the Property Dam-
age measure we are able to reject the null hypothesis using the bootstrap standard
errors. Under cluster standard errors we are also able to reject the null for Injuries.
In practical terms these ndings imply that on average individuals that participate
relative to those that do not are one percentage point less likely to engage in conicts
where there are property damages or injuries. Relative to the mean percentage of
Property damages and Injuries in our sample this amounts to a reduction of almost
60% and 90% respectively. Notice that this e¤ect is similar to the one found for
Property Damages using the propensity score matching procedure.
6 Conclusions
The level of conicts is a relevant policy variable given its high correlation with the
quality of life within a prison. Either adhering to deterrence or retributions views
for punishment, if prison conditions are degraded, e¤ective punishment di¤ers from
the one mandated by law. This "extra" punishment, which is not legislated, may
indicate a divergence from societys taste for punishment, as indicated by its legal
system. Also, maintaining order within a prison is costly and puts pressure on sub-
national governmentsbudgets. In this sense, it is important to see if there are any
policies which can lower in prison conict.
Using a census of sentenced male Argentinean prisoners for 2002-2005 we estimate
the e¤ect that prison based education programs have on in prison conict behav-
ior. The treatment and control groups are selected based on Law 24.660 from 1996
which mandates that all prisoners with less than the minimum required education
level (complete EGB) should participate in educational programs. Under probit and
propensity score matching methodologies we nd that participation in education pro-
grams reduces signicantly injuries, property damages, sanctions and severe sanctions
within prisons. Using per capita expenditure in education at the province level as an
instrument for participation we nd that education programs reduce only property
damages in a statistically signicant way. The results of IV probit suggest that the
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probit di¤erence estimator presents a positive selection bias implying that prison-
ers with a higher innate violence propensity are self selected (or selected by prison
authorities) into these programs.
The reduction in conicts due to education participation is compatible with two
transmission mechanisms. On the one side, education programs could change prison-
ersmoral values and psychological attitudes towards violent behavior. On the other
side, it could simply be the result of less idle time. Even though we believe that the
rst channel is the one at work, for policy purposes it might not be so important to
distinguish between both channels. As far as behavior within prisons is concerned,
the relevant aspect is that education programs can reduce conictive and violent be-
havior which is important per se. For behavior outside the prison, once the sentence
term is completed, the evidence in favor of the positive e¤ects of education programs
on violent behavior, reduction in recidivism and better labor opportunities has been
established.
Even though we are not able to do a cost benet analysis of education programs
inside prisons the evidence suggests that these should be promoted and extended if
they turn out to be nancially viable. Future research should comprise a cost benet
analysis not only including the monetary value of conict reduction inside prisons but
also measuring the positive e¤ects education has outside penitentiaries.
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Appendix
State Number of Prisoners
Mean Rate of 
Participation Standard Deviation
Buenos Aires 3,319 0.28 0.45
CABA 364 0.10 0.30
Catamarca 365 0.01 0.10
Chaco 8,005 0.34 0.47
Chubut 932 0.47 0.50
Cordoba 1,318 0.36 0.48
Corrientes 1,378 0.71 0.45
Entre Rios 1,020 0.20 0.40
Formosa 402 0.53 0.50
Jujuy 347 0.27 0.44
La Pampa 548 0.20 0.40
La Rioja 48 0.00 0.00
Mendoza 172 0.12 0.32
Misiones 970 0.12 0.32
Neuquen 613 0.30 0.46
Rio Negro 692 0.30 0.46
Salta 809 0.11 0.31
San Juan 658 0.09 0.29
San Luis 387 0.03 0.17
Santa Cruz 130 0.73 0.45
Santa Fe 3,539 0.22 0.41
Santiago del Estero 89 0.34 0.48
Tierra del Fuego 62 0.15 0.36
Tucuman 364 0.09 0.29
Total 26,531 0.25 0.37
Source: SNEEP. Authors calculations
Table 1: Rate of participation in formal education programs of prisoners who should be 
receiving education
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Characteristic
Number of 
Prisoners Mean
Standard 
Deviation
Individual characteristics
Age 26,501 31.22 9.93
Married 26,531 0.11 -
Unemployed when entered prison 26,531 0.31 -
Number of years in prison 23,804 3.68 2.49
Number of crimes committed 26,531 1.32 0.68
Participates in working programs 26,531 0.49 -
Participates in sport activities 26,415 0.86 -
Received visits in the past year 26,531 0.83 -
Tried to escape 26,406 0.09 -
Has a reduction in sentence time 26,026 0.04 -
Recidivist 26,133 0.32 -
Prison Characteristics
Number of inmates 26,531 802.00 609.03
Average age of prisoners 26,531 31.47 2.53
% Assassins 26,531 0.16 0.13
% Rapist 26,531 0.22 0.30
% Thieves 26,531 0.53 0.14
% Inmates with primary education 26,531 0.50 0.17
% Inmates with secondary education 26,531 0.15 0.08
% Inmates with tertiary education 26,531 0.00 0.01
% Inmates who tried to escape 26,531 0.09 0.25
Source: SNEEP. Authors calculations
Table 2: Characteristics of prisoners and prisons
Characteristic Number of Prisoners Mean
Standard 
Deviation
Injuries 25,066 0.01 0.08
Damaged Property 25,066 0.02 0.13
Sanctions 25,066 0.09 0.28
Severe Sanctions 25,066 0.08 0.27
Source: SNEEP. Authors calculations
Table 3: Measures of Violence inside prisons
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I II III IV I II III IV
Participates in Education Program 0.029 -0.159 -0.231 -0.227 -0.302 -0.263 -0.221 -0.209
(0.063) (0.085)+ (0.092)* (0.093)* (0.065)** (0.078)** (0.102)* (0.103)*
[0.233] [0.195] [0.137]+ [0.137]+ [0.328] [0.312] [0.170] [0.169]
Participates in work activities -0.402 -0.23
(0.087)** (0.074)**
[0.072]** [0.153]
Number of years in prison 0.031 0.031 0.033 0.025 0.036 0.033
(0.014)* (0.014)* (0.014)* (0.013)+ (0.015)* (0.015)*
[0.011]** [0.010]** [0.011]** [0.025] [0.026] [0.029]
Age -0.037 -0.037 -0.034 -0.059 -0.066 -0.065
(0.006)** (0.007)** (0.007)** (0.005)** (0.006)** (0.006)**
[0.011]** [0.009]** [0.010]** [0.007]** [0.006]** [0.005]**
Married -0.195 -0.174 -0.163 -0.367 -0.052 -0.051
(0.181) (0.186) (0.187) (0.137)** (0.138) (0.138)
[0.196] [0.204] [0.208] [0.191]+ [0.125] [0.127]
Unemployed when entered prison 0.013 0.051 -0.059 -0.117 0.019 -0.102
(0.075) (0.077) (0.085) (0.062)+ (0.068) (0.076)
[0.048] [0.082] [0.104] [0.058]* [0.066] [0.112]
Number of crimes committed 0.078 0.042 0.041 0.018 -0.023 -0.021
(0.047)+ (0.048) (0.048) (0.046) (0.053) (0.054)
[0.023]** [0.026] [0.026] [0.055] [0.064] [0.066]
Participates in sport activities 0.01 -0.008 -0.004 -0.387 -0.625 -0.623
(0.092) (0.097) (0.100) (0.063)** (0.081)** (0.081)**
[0.067] [0.078] [0.076] [0.197]* [0.244]* [0.247]*
Received visits in the past year -0.233 -0.127 -0.128 -0.445 -0.092 -0.09
(0.095)* (0.097) (0.098) (0.087)** (0.090) (0.090)
[0.100]* [0.095] [0.093] [0.172]** [0.102] [0.102]
Tried to escape -0.14 0.646 0.652 -0.025 0.592 0.621
(0.167) (0.215)** (0.215)** (0.126) (0.166)** (0.167)**
[0.222] [0.349]+ [0.340]+ [0.233] [0.231]* [0.219]**
Has a reduction in sentence time -0.101 -0.201 -0.165 -0.73 -0.636 -0.624
(0.178) (0.184) (0.186) (0.235)** (0.264)* (0.264)*
[0.152] [0.149] [0.151] [0.151]** [0.186]** [0.191]**
Recidivist 0.177 0.163 0.147 0.109 0.137 0.133
(0.069)* (0.073)* (0.074)* (0.067) (0.073)+ (0.073)+
[0.092]+ [0.097]+ [0.102] [0.089] [0.087] [0.085]
Prison and State Characteristics NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES
Observations 20,774 17,754 17,754 17,754 19,295 16,553 16,553 16,553
Robust standard errors in parenthesis (+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%)
Cluster (at province level) standard errors in brackets (+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%)
All regressions include state and time fixed effects. 
continues on the next page
Characteristic
Table 4: Probit estimates. Dependent Variables: Conflict/Violent Behavior
Injuries Property Damage
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I II III IV I II III IV
Participates in Education Program -0.106 -0.131 -0.144 -0.128 -0.075 -0.087 -0.116 -0.1
(0.026)** (0.031)** (0.033)** (0.033)** (0.027)** (0.031)** (0.034)** (0.034)**
[0.089] [0.080]+ [0.057]* [0.056]* [0.060] [0.055] [0.052]* [0.053]+
Participates in work activities -0.443 -0.417
(0.032)** (0.033)**
[0.120]** [0.118]**
Number of years in prison 0.009 0.013 0.018 0.006 0.01 0.015
(0.006) (0.006)* (0.006)** (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)*
[0.010] [0.008] [0.009]* [0.009] [0.008] [0.008]+
Age -0.046 -0.047 -0.045 -0.047 -0.048 -0.045
(0.002)** (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.003)** (0.003)** (0.003)**
[0.006]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.006]** [0.005]** [0.005]**
Married -0.139 -0.101 -0.088 -0.084 -0.062 -0.046
(0.056)* (0.058)+ (0.058) (0.057) (0.060) (0.060)
[0.086] [0.070] [0.074] [0.083] [0.078] [0.082]
Unemployed when entered prison 0.04 0.075 -0.03 0 0.039 -0.058
(0.029) (0.031)* (0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.034)+
[0.051] [0.051] [0.059] [0.063] [0.061] [0.061]
Number of crimes committed 0.04 0.043 0.044 0.04 0.045 0.047
(0.020)* (0.021)* (0.021)* (0.021)+ (0.022)* (0.022)*
[0.020]* [0.021]* [0.025]+ [0.021]+ [0.024]+ [0.027]+
Participates in sport activities -0.275 -0.371 -0.369 -0.312 -0.381 -0.382
(0.036)** (0.040)** (0.041)** (0.037)** (0.041)** (0.042)**
[0.095]** [0.142]** [0.139]** [0.135]* [0.161]* [0.157]*
Received visits in the past year -0.212 -0.118 -0.125 -0.119 -0.031 -0.038
(0.037)** (0.038)** (0.039)** (0.038)** (0.040) (0.040)
[0.082]* [0.065]+ [0.069]+ [0.092] [0.094] [0.100]
Tried to escape -0.13 -0.177 -0.134 -0.129 -0.26 -0.217
(0.057)* (0.104)+ (0.103) (0.059)* (0.110)* (0.108)*
[0.147] [0.388] [0.385] [0.132] [0.377] [0.373]
Has a reduction in sentence time -0.15 -0.203 -0.196 -0.084 -0.139 -0.131
(0.074)* (0.076)** (0.076)** (0.078) (0.081)+ (0.081)
[0.305] [0.254] [0.256] [0.279] [0.219] [0.224]
Recidivist 0.192 0.2 0.184 0.207 0.218 0.202
(0.029)** (0.030)** (0.030)** (0.030)** (0.031)** (0.031)**
[0.082]* [0.085]* [0.091]* [0.088]* [0.089]* [0.095]*
[0.140]** [0.112]*
Prison and State Characteristics NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES
Observations 24,918 21,582 21,582 21,582 24,918 21,582 21,582 21,582
Robust standard errors in parenthesis (+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%)
Cluster (at province level) standard errors in brackets (+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%)
All regressions include state and time fixed effects. 
Severe SanctionsSanctions
Characteristic
Table 4 (continued): Probit estimates. Dependent Variables: Conflict/Violent 
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Conflict/Violence
Number of 
observations
ATT Bias
Bootstrap 
S.E.
T-stat
Injuries 6,305 -0.003 0.001 0.002 -1.531
Property Damage 6,305 -0.009 0.000 0.003 -3.284
Sanctions 6,305 -0.019 0.000 0.007 -2.734
Severe Sanctions 6,305 -0.015 0.001 0.007 -2.257
All estimates are based on local linear regression matching.
Table 5: Propensity Score Matching Estimates
Characteristic Injuries
Property 
Damage
Sanctions
Severe 
Sanctions
Participates in Education Program -1.556 -2.543 -0.183 -0.047
(1.059) (0.773)** (0.544) (0.514)
[0.918]+ [1.473]+ [0.804] [0.924]
Observations 17,754 16,553 21,535 21,535
First Stage
State per capita investment in Education 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002
(0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)**
[0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]+ [0.001]+
Bootstrap standard errors in parenthesis (+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%)
Cluster (at province level) standard errors in brackets (+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%)
All regressions include state and time fixed effects as well as the controls in Models IV of Table 4.
Table 6: IV Probit estimates. Dependent Variables: Conflict/Violent Behavior
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Figure 1
Injuries in Elegible Population during 2002-2005
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Figure 2
Property Damages in Elegible Population during 2002-2005
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Figure 3
Sanctions in Elegible Population during 2002-2005
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Figure 4
Severe Sanctions in Elegible Population during 2002-2005
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